HEU Transparency Program in Russia
November 17, 2009
In the “closed” cities of Seversk and Zelenogorsk in Siberia, and Novouralsk in the Ural’s region, four NSTec employees
from RSL-Nellis and RSL-Andrews monitor the Russian uranium processing facilities to de-enrich their highly enriched uranium.
Senior Technical Staff Bob Richmond is the project manager for the Department of Energy’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) transparency
program in Russia. With Bob, Senior Scientist Bill Beal, Principal Operations Specialist Ed Roberts and Senior Engineer Ken Braithwaite
are among 80 special monitors approved by American and Russian governments to work side by side with Russian scientists to monitor the
down-blending of HEU to low-enriched uranium, or LEU. The LEU is then sent to the United States to manufacture fuel for commercial nuclear power
reactors. For the United States, this transparency with the Russians provides confidence that the LEU being purchased by the
United States is not newly produced in Russia’s enrichment plants, but is derived from weapon components.
All of the RSL monitors are trained in operating and maintaining the Blend-Down Monitoring System (BDMS) at the sites visited by the
HEU program. The BDMS monitors uranium mass flow rates and uranium enrichment when monitors are not present (less than 20 percent of the
monitors are trained on this equipment). All RSL monitors are trained to use specialized non-destructive assay equipment to perform
spectral analysis to determine the enrichment of the HEU and LEU. Additionally, RSL personnel assist in developing BDMS training courses
and teaching BDMS classes to U.S. and Russian technical experts. RSL supports, on average, eight-to-10 one-week monitoring trips per year.
“Things have changed a lot since my first trip in 2000,” says Ken Braithwaite (RSL has been involved in the HEU program
since 1998). “Early on, things were stricter, with the way the U.S. presence was perceived. It was a novelty because those cities
didn’t have a lot of foreign visitors (which is why they’re ‘closed’). We were escorted everywhere we went. But as the program
matured, the more people saw us and we them, trust was built, and there was more openness. We’re still escorted, but there’s not nearly
the novelty of having foreigners in their cities anymore.” The team includes an American interpreter during their trips to
Russia, where there are more interpreters to work with. “Many of the Russians speak English anyway,” adds Ken.
In 1993, the U.S. and Russia signed a 20-year agreement to dispose of 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons.
In 2008, the program celebrated its 15th year of existence.